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The Meaning of Marriage: State Efforts
to Facilitate Friendship, Love,
and Childrearing

RICHARD ARNESON*

What business does the government have in sticking its nose into
people’s private affairs? What affairs could be more legitimately private
than relationships involving sex and love?
I. LOCKEAN LIBERTARIANISM
These questions resonate with many individuals across a wide range
of ideologies and beliefs. For many of us these questions will strike us
as rhetorical questions to which the obvious answers are “none” and
“none.” These responses reflect a Lockean libertarian strain in the social
thinking of many intelligent and thoughtful people.
Of course matters are more complex, even as viewed from a Lockean
libertarian perspective.1 Sex and love tend to bring about new children,
and causing a child to exist is a social act with wide consequences for
other people who could not be supposed to consent to bear these
consequences. Libertarians will regard with equanimity the showering
* Professor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego. I thank Connie
Rosati, who commented on this paper at a conference at the University of San Diego
School of Law, for shrewd suggestions and insights.
1. For the canonical statement of Lockean libertarianism, see ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 10 (1974). For John Locke’s views, see JOHN LOCKE,
SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (J.W. Gough ed., Basil, Blackwell & Mort Ltd.
1966) (1690); also consider A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS (1992)
and A. JOHN SIMMONS, ON THE EDGE OF ANARCHY: LOCKE, CONSENT, AND THE LIMITS OF
SOCIETY (1993).
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of externalities in the form of benefits that typically accompany the
creation and upbringing of a responsible competent person who becomes
a useful member of society. The libertarian will insist that the receipt of
such benefits does not generate any reciprocal obligations to benefit
those who benefit us in these unconsented to ways—at least, not
obligations that are legitimately enforceable and that justify forcible
imposition on people’s liberty to lead their lives as they choose.
However, bringing children into the world can, and often does, impose
net costs on people who do not consent to bear these costs. The
introduction of one extra person may strain scarce resources. A Lockean
Proviso may be triggered, affecting everyone’s property rights. Bringing
a child into the world and failing to see to it that the child is properly
socialized may be the moral equivalent of tossing into a crowd an
inexpertly wired bomb that might, or might not, explode and injure one
person, or many. In these, and perhaps other ways, causing a child to
exist might be violating the rights of others.
Even if two individuals brought a child into existence in an isolated
world in which no one would be affected in any way except the two
parents and the child, the Lockean will surely hold that by bringing a
child into the world one incurs obligations to that child to sustain its
well-being and prepare it for adult life.2 It is not clear to me what a
Lockean libertarian view entails concerning the shape and strength of the
child’s rights to aid from its parents. Whatever minimal acceptable
threshold level of parental care is set by those rights, it would seem that
such rights are legitimately enforceable. For example, if one parent
significantly violates obligations of care toward his child, it would be
morally legitimate for the other parent to compel compliance.
Given that an activity violates Lockean rights, it does not automatically
follow that there is a legitimate regulatory role for the state to play.
Perhaps Lockeanism rightly understood implies anarchism, so there are
no legitimate functions for the state to fulfill. However, if Lockeanism
does allow that a minimal night watchman state could be morally
legitimate, the legitimate functions that such a state would serve would

2. This formulation slides past a large issue: At what point in the development of
a human child does the child acquire significant moral rights that include a right to care
and nurturance from parents? See F.M. KAMM, CREATION AND ABORTION: A STUDY IN
MORAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1992) (offering a sophisticated broadly Lockean
account of this issue). I assume that at the very least, at some point in the development
of a child, those responsible for bringing it into the world must either see to it that the
child’s life is terminated or that some responsible adult persons agree to take on the full
complement of rights and obligations identified with the parental social role. It is not
morally acceptable that a child should be brought into the world and simply left to
languish without care.

980

ARNESON.DOC

8/7/2019 12:45 PM

[VOL. 42: 979, 2005]

The Meaning of Marriage
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

surely include enforcement of children’s rights to adequate care from
their parents.
Activities that bring children into the world may violate the Lockean
rights of nonconsenting other people by wrongfully bringing about a
newborn person that has rights to a share of what used to be other
people’s resources or by creating undue risk via neglectful parenting that
the newborn child will eventually commit antisocial acts. These
possibilities aside, activities that bring children into the world may
wrongfully threaten to establish a state of affairs in which a child’s right
to care from its parents is not fulfilled. These considerations provide
grounds for legitimate Lockean restriction of family life. So far as I can
tell, these considerations are exhaustive. In particular, a social scientific
finding that restricting people’s legal opportunity to exit from marital
arrangements would increase the expected well-being of the adults who
enter these arrangements by contract would provide no reason at all for
any state or private use of coercion to restrict people’s legal opportunity
in this way. Lockean adults are perfectly at liberty to enter into less than
optimal or even self-destructive marital arrangements if they choose.
Moreover, a social scientific finding that restricting adult individuals’
freedom to cohabit on whatever terms they find mutually agreeable
would increase children’s average well-being appreciably (though no
child would fail to get the minimal level of parental care to which she is
strictly entitled according to Lockean rights theory if the restriction is
not enforced) would provide no legitimate reason for enforcing such a
restriction. Rights are trumps, according to the Lockean.
II. PRIORITARIAN CONSEQUENTIALISM
The considerations that the Lockean singles out as legitimately
shaping correct conduct and just social policy seem to me to be
undeniably morally relevant. What is harder to swallow is the negative
claim that nothing else legitimately shapes policy.
This essay approaches the issue of state regulation of marriage from a
standpoint opposed to the Lockean natural rights tradition. This standpoint
is a close cousin of utilitarianism. The fundamental moral norm is that
acts and policies should be selected to produce the best outcome, and
outcomes are to be assessed in terms of the quality of human lives that
people achieve. This outcome assessment assigns greater value to achieving
a well-being gain, or preventing a loss, for a person, the lower the
person’s lifetime well-being would otherwise be, and the greater the size
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of the well-being gain. In other words, we ought to maximize weighted
well-being (weighted by priority for the worse off).3
What this prioritarian doctrine implies as to what actions we should
choose and what social policies we should institute depends crucially on
the nature of well-being—what constitutes it and what facilitates it.4 For
purposes of the present discussion of appropriate state policy toward
marriage arrangements, we need not enter deeply into an inquiry into the
nature of human well-being. So far as love, sex, and childrearing are
concerned, my sense is that we, for the most part, agree about what is
desirable and worthwhile. The difficult questions revolve around the
issue of what, if anything, the state can sensibly do to promote the good
without thereby doing even more to promote the bad and the ugly.
Regarding the values that are usually thought to be at stake in the
regulation of family life, I hold what I take to be entirely conventional
and banal views. Pleasurable harmless sex acts between mutually
consenting adults are good per se and inherently enhance the quality of
the lives of the participating individuals. These sexual acts are good qua
pleasurable. The acts have an imaginative and sensory content that is
typically innocent (but can be morally problematic, for example, if one is
sexually aroused by the thought of oneself beating up another person).
These acts can exhibit a kind of athletic excellence, and be virtuous
accomplishments. They can be also be virtuous along another dimension
if appropriately motivated, (for example, if one aims at mutually enhancing
the pleasure of all co-participants). The cooperating parties have a
mutual friendly regard for one another and a mutual appreciation of the
short-term common project in which they are engaged.
Mutually pleasurable casual sex as described above is a significant
human good. Whether the sexual desire that motivates this activity is
directed at a member of the human species of the opposite sex or of the
same sex is morally inconsequential so far as I can see.5 If humans were
psychologically capable only of sustaining casual sexual encounters, the
3. On prioritarianism, see Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?, in THE IDEAL OF
EQUALITY 81 (Matthew Clayton & Andrew Williams eds., 2000).
4. On the nature of well-being, see JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING,
MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE (1986). See also ROBERT M. ADAMS, Well-Being
and Excellence, in FINITE AND INFINITE GOODS 83, 83 (1999); Richard Kraut, Desire and the
Human Good, Address Before the 92d Cent. Div. Meeting of the Am. Phil. Ass’n (May 6,
1994), in 68 PROC. & ADDRESSES AM. PHIL. ASS’N, at 39–54 (Nov. 1994).
5. A sympathetic reconstruction of traditional arguments derogating homosexual
sex appears in Paul J. Weithman, Natural Law, Morality, and Sexual Complementarity,
in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY: ESSAYS ON LAW AND NATURE 227, 227–28 (David M.
Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997) (quoting John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and
“Sexual Orientation”, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049, 1066–67 (1994)). Weithman
criticizes the traditional arguments he reconstructs, and I find his criticisms compelling.
Weithman does not endorse casual sex as intrinsically valuable as I do.
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state as the agent of a decent society should seek to promote casual sex,
both the frequency, and the quality, of such encounters. A complication
is that humans are typically capable of a greater good, the building and
sustaining of long-term sexual partnerships in which mutual sexual
sharing is combined with intimate friendship and cooperation in shared
life projects, the complex relationship being cemented by assurances (or
the confident mutual expectation) of mutual commitment and fidelity.
Call this a committed sexual friendship (CSF). Moreover, casual sex
sometimes facilitates and sometimes obstructs CSF in a host of familiar
and complex ways. Casual sex is the usual experimental prelude to a
CSF between two people, and in a wide variety of situations, having
casual sex with a person will tend to trigger strong desires either to
sustain a casual sexual relationship with that person or to develop a CSF
with that person. Casual sexual encounters thus become an arena in
which deceit, fraud, exploitation, and wasted investment are common.
Despite its intrinsic desirability, promiscuity justifiably has a bad
reputation. For many people in many situations, the pursuit of promiscuity
tends to lead to the wrongful imposition of harms on one’s associates
and to inhibit the development of an otherwise feasible CSF for self and
others.
At this point a legitimate state interest in the character of people’s
romantic and sexual relationships becomes discernible, an interest that is
distinct and separate from the interest in promoting childrearing
practices that are conducive to increased lifelong well-being of the
individuals formed by these practices. The state should promote CSF,
and seek to enhance the quality of people’s CSF relationships, on the
ground that on the whole and on the average, people will be better off
forming and sustaining such relationships than not doing so.6
6. I stand by the statement in the text, but complications abound. For one thing,
even if CSF tends to be a greater good than casual sex, there might be mixtures of CSF
and promiscuity in a person’s life that involve more fulfillment for self and others than
any feasible life plan for that individual involving CSF alone. These mixtures might
come about by way of the individual pursuing casual sex at one stage of life and CSF at
another stage, or perhaps the individual might pursue a form of CSF that is tolerant
of casual sex with persons other than the CSF partner(s). Also, casual sex and CSF
may be viewed as end points on a continuum, and individuals might pursue any of
various midrange points rather than either extreme. Moreover, there is a range of
individual personalities varying in propensities to generate well-being for self and others
when pursuing different romantic plans of life. These issues are explored endlessly in
soap operas, popular songs, and other popular culture manifestations; philosophical
analysis may be otiose.
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The prioritarian pursues this concern with a twist. She assigns greater
moral value to obtaining well-being gains for people, the worse off they
would be without those gains. Regarding romance and CSF, she gives
extra weight, not to securing gains for those who are disadvantaged
specifically with regard to those goods, but to those who are worse off in
well-being prospects generally.
Whether or not one accepts the prioritarian placement of a thumb on
the scale in favor of the badly off, everyone should agree that the issue
of how to treat conflicts of interest between those with poor life
prospects and those with good life prospects has a large influence on
people’s views on appropriate state policy. Many policies that work just
fine for competent choosers, who tend to fill the ranks of the better off,
will work to the disadvantage of less competent choosers, who tend to be
less well off overall. A difficult issue of distributive fairness arises here,
and reappears in many social policy choices.
In principle, according to prioritarian doctrine, there is no limit to
the sorts of considerations that could legitimately figure in the moral
cost-benefit calculation that would determine morally right social policy
concerning romance, sex, and childrearing. Anything that affects people’s
well-being now or in the future can tilt the scale.7 Without any justifying
argument I shall just stipulate what I believe to be true. Three considerations
loom large in determining appropriate state policy in this domain. Two
have been mentioned: (1) the state has a legitimate interest in promoting
good childrearing to boost people’s lifetime expected well-being, and
(2) the state has a legitimate interest in promoting CSF to boost people’s
lifetime expected well-being. A third consideration is equality between
men and women: (3) the state has a legitimate interest in promoting
social arrangements that bring us closer to a world in which being born a
woman is not per se disadvantageous, that is, a world in which the
average well-being level of men and the average well-being level of
women is roughly the same.8
7. Nancy L. Rosenblum considers the view that “appropriately ordered intimate
relations reinforce democracy.” Democratic Sex: Reynolds v. U.S., Sexual Relations,
and Community, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY, supra note 5, at 63, 65. The idea
that we should inter alia regulate romantic life to improve the quality of democracy is
doubly instrumental in prioritarian perspective. Democratic political ideals are assessed
for their instrumental contribution to priority-weighted well-being, and sexual regulation
is then assessed according to its potential contribution to the degree to which appropriate
democratic political ideals are satisfied. Id.
8. A concern for equality of life prospects between men and women is valued by
the prioritarian on instrumental grounds—equality is a means to achieving greater
priority-weighted well-being. For an indication as to how this argument might go, see
JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1911) (1869).
See also SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY (1989). In an
interesting discussion of how social trends combine to weaken marriage and how we
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III. MARRIAGE
The three desiderata just stated stand in no determinate relationship to
the institution of marriage as we see it in the contemporary U.S. and
other modern democratic societies. Nothing hinted at so far in this essay
demonstrates that we should assign primary responsibility for childrearing
to the biological parents (the sources of the sperm and egg that unite to
generate, eventually, a child), rather than to the community as a whole.
Nothing said so far implies that it is desirable that people should seek
CSF within the very same partnership arrangement that is dedicated to
producing and rearing children (if we assume for the moment that people
should be at least permitted to enter into partnership arrangements for
the purpose of childrearing). Normative discussion of these matters is
plagued by a double risk—on the one hand of reiterating banalities,
obvious truths everyone already knows, and on the other hand of asserting
as true what are really demonstrably false claims that masquerade as
obvious truths.
To start the discussion, I shall simply describe what I suppose is a
conventional understanding of marriage as it ought to be. The remainder
of this essay tentatively explores considerations that ought to shape
public policy in this domain.
The current institution of marriage serves several functions. In the
traditional marriage, a young man and woman fall in love and pledge to
be sexually faithful to each other, live together, be intimate friends, pool
financial assets, and cooperate as a team that develops and executes a
common plan of life that is an important element in each individual’s
separate life plan. This common plan of life includes bearing and raising
children together. The mutual pledge that establishes a marriage is a
lifelong vow, “for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness,
and in health, . . . till death [do us part]. ”9 As the quoted words indicate,
there is an insurance aspect to marriage. Good and bad fortune is
might reverse these trends, James Q. Wilson disparages Okin’s policy proposals—that
we should strive to bring about equal sharing of income, childrearing, and housework
between the husband and wife in every marriage. Okin advances these proposals with a
view to promoting equality of a sort between men and women; Wilson does not declare
whether he accepts or rejects this broad goal. See JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE
PROBLEM 187–90 (2002). As noted later in this essay, the consequentialist of my stripe
only contingently supports equality of any sort, and on some egalitarian views, a genuine
commitment to equality requires a deeper commitment.
9. BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER 292 (John E. Booty ed., Univ. of Va. Press 1976)
(1559).
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shared, and if one suffers disaster, the spouse is expected to lend a
steady helping hand. In infirmity and in old age, spouses assume
caretaker roles. To some extent, the insurance aspect of marriage extends
across generations.
What I have called the “traditional” model of marriage is roughly the
main conception of it in twentieth-century America, lightly modified by
concerns for equality between men and women. The light modification
is that role expectations for husband and wife are left unspecified. The
more traditional ideal of marriage would stipulate that the wife is to be
homemaker and the husband the breadwinner, and would urge the wife
to obey and the husband to command wisely. Here the husband is
understood to be male, the wife female.
The traditional ideal of marriage receives some legal protection. By
law in most jurisdictions, marriage is between one man and one woman.
Property that accrues to either spouse is jointly owned by the couple. If a
marriage lasts for several years, there is a presumption that both spouses
have contributed to the income potential of the spouse with higher
income, so there is income sharing required by law if the marriage
dissolves. The state also sets the terms of divorce, and in contemporary
practice, this generally means that each marriage contract must contain
an easy exit clause via the option of no-fault divorce. Some states offer
no-fault divorce but fault-based determination of terms of alimony.
Except in states that now allow the option of the more restrictive
covenant marriage, no person may sign a legally binding marriage
contract that provides for no exit via divorce or includes clauses that
render divorce difficult.
The traditional ideal of marriage is sustained by social norms and by
dominant trends in most people’s desires. Even in the contemporary
world, in which marriage and family life is buffeted by social forces,
awareness of which is now widely shared, most of us grow up wanting
and expecting to become married. We hope that our marriages will be
successful for a lifetime. Though given the fact that about half of first
marriages end in divorce, we probably marry now with a pair of fingers
crossed behind our backs, and at least some residual dim appreciation of
the reasonableness of providing in advance for what to do after a
marriage crumbles. Although there is greater social acceptance than in
the past of living as an adult without marrying, and of living as a
married adult without having and raising children, most people still
want marriage, and a childless couple is an object of pity. For that
matter, most men probably hanker after the days in which the traditional
division of marital roles between husband and wife was regarded as
unproblematic, and some women have not freed themselves from similar
hankerings.
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Traditional marriage is a package deal, bundling together several
distinct functions. The question immediately arises, whether or not these
various functions are better fulfilled by being bundled in this way than
they would be if they were assigned separately. Of course, to some
extent legal and social marriage arrangements are a shell that can be
molded to different shapes and filled with different content as times
change and people’s needs with them. The household economy of the
family is no longer so important as it was, say, at the beginning of the
twentieth century. Goods and services that used to be produced in the
home are now purchased in the marketplace and brought to the home for
consumption. Still, marital substance is significantly determined by the
form of marriage—what sorts of lives people will live within the
institution or alongside it.
The traditional marriage ideal presumes that the lover of your life will
also be the person with whom you share childrearing joys and responsibilities
if you have children. Why this presumption? The qualities that make one a
good lover and intimate friend are not the same as the qualities that make
one a good cooperative partner in the enterprise of childrearing, and it is
commonplace that the two sets of qualities do not always coexist in the
same person. Imagine that Maria, a heterosexual woman, has a long-term
exclusive sexual friendship with Igor, but lives with her long-term friend
Frances. The two women friends pool their finances and jointly share
parenting responsibilities for the children they bear. In effect, Maria is
married, but the marital status roles are split across two persons. Perhaps
this arrangement is a bad idea, perhaps not. One wonders why the state
should put its stamp of approval behind one particular bundling of social
roles, the ones constitutive of traditional marriage.
In discussing alternatives to traditional marriage the discussion can
easily veer off into irrelevant silliness. Some forms of family life that
might look attractive from some normative theoretical armchair
perspective might be ways of living that no actual persons will ever
come to desire, or desire strongly enough to make the way of living a
socially recognized and viable option for people. In the absence of
tyrannical uses of state power that no sensible normative principles
would condone, the imaginary alternatives are just that, imaginary
alternatives. The discussion of such alternatives is no more fruitful than
reflections on what life would be like if humans had wings and could fly.
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Recall that the topic of this essay is not what form of marriage is ideal,
but rather what form of regulation of marriage-type arrangements ought
to be enforced by the state in a decent society. That is to say, given
people and the background of institutions pretty much as they are, what
regulation of marriage makes sense.
Consider as a starting point what I will call the Lockean baseline option:
The state should simply enforce whatever voluntary contracts individuals
make with one another concerning romantic, sexual, family, and marital
arrangements—provided these arrangements (1) do not wrongfully
impose costs on unconsenting third parties, and (2) do not run afoul of
the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring that every child has an adequate
level of nurturance, education, and socialization.10
One complication is what to do about risky contracts. Suppose some
types of romantic contracts individuals might be prone to make do not
necessarily result in harm to children, but are associated with greater
risks of unacceptable harms to children than other sorts of arrangements.11
The prioritarian approach veers off from the Lockean regulatory regime
for another reason already noted. Suppose that romantic arrangements of
types A and B both lead to outcomes for children above the Lockean
baseline set by children’s rights. Suppose further that the A type
arrangements result in significantly better above-baseline outcomes for
children and do not incur any other significant moral costs, compared to
the B type arrangements. Prioritarianism will then favor regulation
by state policy that tends to induce people to opt for A rather than B
(provided some feasible regulation passes a prioritarian cost-benefit
assessment), but the Lockean prohibits any coercive restriction of
people’s liberty with respect to their activities that violate no one’s
rights. The same opposition of principle emerges for the desiderata
of promoting CSF and promoting equality in men’s and women’s life
prospects. But insofar as there is uncertainty, perhaps in-principle
ineliminable uncertainty, in the normative and empirical measurement that
enables us to judge what the weighted well-being consequences
would be of adopting one or another marital regulatory regime,
prioritarianism in practice might disagree with Lockeanism mainly in
being more permissive: in allowing that any of several different and

10. Richard Posner endorses something in the neighborhood of this proposal in
The Economic Approach to Homosexuality, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND THE FAMILY, supra
note 5, at 173, 173–91. See also RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992).
11. For discussion of the difficulties the Lockean libertarian theory encounters in
determining how risks affect the interpretation of rights, see PETER RAILTON, Locke,
Stock, and Peril: Natural Property Rights, Pollution, and Risk, in FACTS, VALUES, AND
NORMS: ESSAYS TOWARD A MORALITY OF CONSEQUENCE 187, 187–225 (2003).
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opposed regulatory regimes might be equally good, so far as we can
know, from the standpoint of achieving best outcomes.12
Two assumptions are stated below. If accepted, they do not suffice to
show that society should depart from enforcing the Lockean baseline all
the way to giving legal privileges to traditional marriage. However, they
do suggest that the state ought to be fostering some cousin, or other close
relative, of traditional marriage. Exactly what type of regulatory regime
might be best, is a question that remains open, for all that this essay
argues or asserts.
(1) On the whole and on the average,13 a child is better off if raised
under the steady supervision of a small number (larger than one) of
parent or guardian individuals who have primary direct responsibility for
meeting the child’s needs and carry out this function without interruption
until the child is full-grown.
(2) On the whole and on the average, an adult is better off if he or she
lives with at least one other adult who is both a long-term friend and a
long-term sexual partner.
Given 1 and 2, there is some reason for the state, acting as the agent of
a decent society, to promote steady parenting and CSF cohabitation. This
does not yet yield a rationale for promoting arrangements that combine
these roles, but perhaps reasons are not far to seek. Given that time is a
scarce resource, if one is going to rear children and cohabit in a CSF
relationship, it is convenient if both activities occur under the same roof
with the same partners. Moreover, the shared project of parenting is for
many people an important and valued dimension of CSF. Also, having a
successful long-term friendship and sexual relationship with the same
person(s) with whom one is carrying out a long-term childrearing project
gives one extra incentive to stay the course and continue cooperatively
participating in the parenting role. Successfully cooperating in the
childrearing endeavor could also induce one to persist in a CSF that was
encountering troubles which would spell doom for the relationship were
it not for the shared parenting. Of course, in a culture that prizes and
glorifies romantic fulfillment, when individuals are raising children and
12. An interesting attempt to show that a consequentialism that eschews interpersonal
well-being comparisons implies roughly libertarian moral rules and social regulatory policy is
made in RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).
13. This phrasing does not mean that each and every child is better off (averaging
across time periods) when the stated condition holds, but rather that children on the
average are better off if the stated condition holds. One should read assumption (2) in an
analogous fashion.
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engaged in a CSF together and the romance goes sour, there is pressure
to split apart even if the parenting enterprise regarded separately is
proceeding in a satisfactory way. As such, the bundling of roles can
foster instability of parenting partnerships.
The bundling of roles in marriage as we currently understand it creates
a certain oddity, though I think no real inconsistency, in current campaigns
for legal recognition of same-sex marriage. In our culture, society promotes
and celebrates CSFs by assigning legal and social privilege to marriage.
So, unsurprisingly, those of us who press for an end to discrimination
and prejudice against same-sex sexual activity and same-sex CSF,
campaign for same-sex marriage. The legal recognition of same-sex
messages expresses the correct idea that the important goods that are
achieved in sexual activity, sexual friendship, and CSF are equally
available in homosexual and in heterosexual relationships. However,
this concern is somewhat orthogonal to the concerns of people who think
of marriage primarily as a device for facilitating healthy childrearing and
for disciplining adult humans’ obsessive quest for romantic fulfillment
in the service of healthy childrearing. The point emerges clearly if one
imagines that over the long haul, in a society that does not impose any
stigma on homosexuality or discriminate against nonheterosexuals in
any way, it turns out that lesbian couples choose to have children and
engage in childrearing as often or more often than heterosexual couples
do, whereas gay male couples virtually never do so. In such a society,
imagined to be free of sexual orientation prejudice, society might take
various steps to promote CSF, but reserve certain legal constraints and
privileges deemed constitutive of “marriage” and intended to enhance
the quality of childrearing to lesbian and heterosexual couples which are
presumed to be uniquely likely to be part of this enterprise.
IV. DONAGAN
Consider in this context a suggestion advanced by Alan Donagan
some years ago.14 Donagan was not proposing reform of marriage. Nor
was he engaged in utopian speculation as to how family life might be
improved. He was simply interpreting and defending the core morality
of the Judeo-Christian tradition, which he found to be continuous with a
certain strain of Kantianism. Regarding sexual morality, Donagan proposed
that it might be morally permissible for a number of adults to pledge to
share family life together, to cohabit sexually on some mutually agreed
terms, and jointly to share responsibility for any resulting children.15
14.
15.
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Donagan includes a further constraint that involves the pledge by
group members that when bearing a child is a prospect, a woman will
cohabit only with one man so that there will be a determinate father if a
child issues from the woman’s sexual activity.16 Given that even apart
from this further stipulation there would be multiple adults—fellow
commune members—waiting in the wings who have pledged to assume
fully the duties of parenthood, Donagan’s further constraint strikes me as
otiose.17 At any rate, if it was deemed morally important that each child
should know the identity of her biological father in this communal
setting, DNA testing could establish this fact without any insistence on
temporary bouts of monogamy for this purpose.
It should be noted that Donagan limits his account of the morality of
family life to the moral principles that should guide the relations of
adults living together with a view to producing children. A type of
marriage regarded as the initiation of a family by and for mature adults,
to promote their friendship, with procreation ruled out, lies beyond the
scope of his discussion.
Donagan has us imagine a group consisting of roughly equal numbers
of males and females. He tentatively concludes that such a commune
could provide adequate assurance that children born to any group
member will be properly nurtured, educated, and socialized, and
concludes on this basis that such a form of family life might well be
permissible.
Why equal numbers of males and females? Writing in 1977, Donagan
did not have in mind the present day options that reproductive
technology makes available, but even then adoption made it possible for
a partnership that cannot procreate on its own to carry on the enterprise
of childrearing. So it is not clear that a viable reproductive group has to
include any females at all, or any males, much less some specific ratio of
males to females. Extracommunal donated sperm, eggs, and childbearing
services render a commune with any number of males or females
including zero a viable childrearing enterprise. His concern is clearly
16. Id.
17. Donagan’s discussion is premised on the assumption that “a child’s upbringing
is impaired unless the ultimate authorities in charge of it are its natural parents, joined in
a stable marital union.” Id. at 102. I am not entirely sure how this premise is supposed
by Donagan to be compatible with his tentative endorsement of commune style marriage
as morally permissible, since in this form of marriage the communal members as a group
assume joint and individual responsibility for the care and nurture of all children
produced by group members.
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not that the envisaged marital commune is ideally equipped for biological
reproduction, but rather with the issue of polygyny and female
subordination. He mentions and endorses Saint Thomas Aquinas’
comment that in polygynist families the women will tend to become
servants of the men.18
Donagan is concerned with determining morally permissible forms of
family life, whereas my topic is the proper role for state regulation of
family arrangements. Nevertheless, the two topics are closely linked. If
a communal arrangement among adults provides adequately for the care
and upbringing of the children who issue from the arrangement, there
should be a strong presumption that this is a valid form of marriage, and
that the state should not seek to dissuade people from engaging in it by
regulation. In particular, there is no reason to extend legal privileges
only to marriage arrangements that include just two adults rather than
larger numbers of adults.
Hillary Clinton has famously commented, “It takes a village to raise a
child.”19 She has in mind that in order for the childrearing enterprise to
have good prospects of success, the larger community beyond the family
must provide support. However, her comment could equally well be
construed as an expression of doubt that in a modern setting, in which
both members of a two-person marital partnership face pressure from
social norms and the expectation of personal fulfillment to engage as
long-term committed participants in the productive economy, merely
two parents could be expected to manage the job with reasonable
prospects of success. Three, four, five, or more parents are needed—a
village, not just a couple. At least, there should be no legal discrimination
against marriage contracts encompassing more than two adults even if
few individuals are expected to avail themselves of this option.
V. POLYGYNY
This last comment takes us back to the concern that certain forms of
marriage, though they would not pose threats to the well-being of
children, might nonetheless be inherently wrongful by posing risks of
harm, bad subordination, or degradation, for their willing adult participants.
A Lockean libertarian position would dismiss any such concern on the
ground that no wrongful injury is done to one who voluntarily consents

18. Id. at 102 (citing 3 [PROVIDENCE] SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, ON THE TRUTH OF
CATHOLIC FAITH: SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES, pt.2, at 152 (Vernon J. Bourke trans.,
Hanover House 1956) (1261–64).
19. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, IT TAKES A VILLAGE: AND OTHER LESSONS
CHILDREN TEACH US 12 (1996) (quoting an old African proverb).
THE
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to interact with another adult, no matter how injurious the interaction
proves to be. All rights one has to be treated in any specified way are
waivable and alienable by one’s voluntary consent. One’s natural moral
rights include this right of alienation and waiver, and the right is morally
important. Each individual has her own life to live, and the judgment as
to how best to live it is hers. Nonwaivable and inalienable rights would
be a grievous affront to this expansive ideal of personal sovereignty.
However, this ideal of personal sovereignty is too expansive. We
humans tend to be very imperfectly reasonable and rational guardians of
our own best interests. So even if one is striving to be reasonably
prudent, one may fail, and fail in such a drastic way that duties of
beneficence are triggered, so that another person who can stop one from
stepping off the cliff may be morally required to give one a coercive
helpful protective shove. A bad marital choice can be the equivalent of
inadvertently jumping off a cliff. Suppose, however, that one is not
ill-informed at all, but simply wants to make a ruin of one’s life,
either by self-abnegating sacrifice of one’s own large interests to get
small benefits for others, or just as a perverse expression of one’s
autonomy. Only a hard paternalism, which critics say has an acrid moral
smell, would countenance forcible restriction of someone’s liberty to
prevent her from self-harming conduct that results from fully informed
and voluntary choice.20
Here the metaphor of self-ownership seems to me to be helpful in charting
the moral limits to personal sovereignty. The idea of self-ownership is that
each adult person should be regarded as having over herself the same full
rights to use and abuse that a person who has full private property rights in an
object has over that object. However, private ownership rights are always
limited by an element of stewardship. As Locke says of the initial acquisition
of unowned land, if one lets the property one acquires go to waste, one’s
property right is eroded and at the limit, forfeited. To carry through the
metaphor of self-ownership, we should acknowledge that each person, the
rightful owner of herself, has a duty of stewardship toward herself, a duty to
make something worthwhile of her life for herself and for others. Grievously
vicious imprudent conduct voluntarily chosen violates this no waste
requirement, and hence opens the individual to morally permitted restriction
of her liberty against her will for her own good.
20. One deservedly influential critic who detects a moral taint in hard paternalism
is Joel Feinberg. See JOEL FEINBERG, Legal Paternalism, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE
BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 110, 110–29 (1980).
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Setting aside the Lockean libertarian doctrine as, in this context, too
extreme, we are left with the harder issue, whether a sensible paternalism or
some related moral position would endorse legal disfavoring of
polygynous marriage. A related moral principle might be a moral constraint
against exploitation. One might hold that morality forbids a person,
contemplating interaction with another on terms that give the first person
the lion’s share of the benefits, to profit in this exploitive way. One
might then hold that the law should follow the track of morality and
stand against the interaction, not in order to prevent loss to the one who
would get the short end of the stick in this arrangement, but to prevent
the wrongful gains of the willing exploiter.
Suppose that a society permits polygamous marriage and that a
significant number of persons exercise this option by entering into one
husband-many wives marriages. Would the consequences of such a
regime of legal polygamy be expectably bad, in a way that would
warrant withdrawal of the legal permission? I find the concern that leads
Donagan to regard polygyny as impermissible to be important, and in
principle this consideration could amount to a good reason for the
prioritarian to demand a legal ban on such marriages. What is much
harder to discern is the likelihood that bad consequences would indeed
ensue. If polygyny is permitted, one might expect that males with
greater than average wealth will make marriage offers that some women
will find attractive. The main expectable result might be that the pool of
eligible women available for marriage shrinks for less wealthy males.
So the historical motivation for banning polygyny might have been
democratic patriarchy rather than any sort of concern for women’s
equality.
Other things being equal, one would expect that having more marital
options increases the leverage of women in the implicit bargaining for
terms of marriage contracts. If wealthy males can offer second-wife and
third-wife status to women who prefer this status to what they can obtain
from men offering first-wife status, the end result might be closer to
egalitarian sharing arrangements in monogamous marriages.
At the level of sheer empirical speculation, one could just as plausibly
describe a scenario in which polygamy is permitted and the main form of
polygamy that develops is polygyny with socially powerful males
wedded to several female mates, most of whom occupy a servile role.
The consequence might be a cultural shift that leads all men to disfavor
the ideal of companionate marriage and to favor the ideal of wife as
servant. The cultural shift puts antiegalitarian pressure on monogamous
arrangements, so that on the whole and on the average, monogamous
marriages become more patriarchal and hierarchical, with men dominant
and women subservient.
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VI. NONWELFARIST IDEALS AND MARRIAGE NORMS
My approach in this essay is to assess marriage practices and possible
alterations of them by their consequences for the quality of human lives.
Permitting polygamy is morally right if it is part of a package of policies
that maximizes weighted well-being and wrong otherwise. Proposed
policies are more right or more wrong, depending on how far they diverge
from what would produce the best outcome for people. Such an
approach is controversial in familiar ways. In the context of assessing
the meaning of marriage, a consequentialism of well-being might fail to
register people’s belief that some modes of conduct are morally wrong,
in and of themselves, whatever the consequences.
The prioritarian’s relentless sifting to find the impact on human
well-being might seem crass from some ideal-based perspectives.21
Broadly, one might hold that there are impersonal values worth respect
that are not reducible to the well-being of humans. In this spirit one
might hold that such strivings as the search for scientific understanding
and the creation of ideal community in marriage are morally valuable for
themselves, as worthy ends, quite apart from any contribution they might
make to human well-being.22 The advocate of such nonwelfarist ideals
might add that we misunderstand human well-being if we do not see it as
properly subordinated to other moral goals. In some cases one pays
proper attention to the well-being of people by helping them gain the
proper relationship and orientation to nonwelfarist goals. Here gaining
the good for people partly consists in assisting them successfully to
pursue excellent goods that are not at all goods for people. Some values
are not for us; rather, we should be for them. Some debates about the
meaning of marriage center on such values, to which the welfarist
consequentialist is blind.
Another possibility is that the welfarist consequentialist is seeing
through prevalent illusions. I cannot in this essay attempt to address this
large issue. I simply note that the nature and depth of the disagreement
between one who holds that some values are impersonal and do not
reduce to well-being gains and losses, and one who denies the
existence of such values depend on the consequentialist’s understanding
of well-being. If she believes that achieving scientific understanding
21. See Connie Rosati, What Is the “Meaning” of “Marriage”?, 42 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1003 (2005).
22. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER 87–94, 108–143 (1998).
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and achieving genuine friendship and love are themselves excellences,
attaining which makes the attainer’s life better for her, then the
consequentialist is not reducing human life to a calculus of happiness.
The aspiration to live so as to create intrinsic goods and make these
excellences accessible to many people, including future people, “makes
human life more than just an exchange of costs and benefits, more than
just a job or a trip to the mall.”23 In this last sentence I am quoting a
Kantian who claims that unless we recognize values that we must live up
to, and that do not bottom out in welfare for self and others, we end up
with a shopping mall notion of human existence. Not so, I say. We
consequentialists may be crass (and maybe being crass is correct, a form
of being plain-spoken), but we aren’t crudely crass.
VII. DIVORCE
An element of the meaning of any contemporary marriage is the
likelihood of its collapse. Roughly one-half of first marriages commencing
in recent years down to the present in the U.S. are likely to end in
divorce. The level of divorce has stabilized slightly below its peak level
reached in 1980, but this tailing off of the divorce rate is not especially
good news to fans of stable marriage, because it has been accompanied
by a decreased tendency for people to engage in marriage rather than
cohabit without formal ties.24
Presumably there is an optimal level of divorce as well as an optimal
distribution of marriages into those that endure and those that break
apart. The optimal level and distribution would ideally balance the
interests of children, adult married partners, and affected other people.
The prioritarian doctrine supplies a schema for determining a proper
weighting of interests and hence a morally right determination of optimal
level and distribution. Presumably the optimal level and distribution of
divorce are determined in tandem with the determination of the optimal
level and distribution of undertakings of marriage commitments. Some
who get divorced should never have taken the vow, but surely not all; for
some, marriage is a reasonable gamble that turns out badly. The idea of
the optimum here is the optimum that feasible alterations in state policy
could achieve, though it is hard to get any clear idea as to what these
23. J. David Velleman, A Right of Self-Termination?, 109 ETHICS 606, 612 (1999).
Velleman holds that a proper ethic sees the source of human dignity in rational nature,
which demands our respect, and should not be regarded merely as one good for us or
source of good for us, to be traded off against other goods and sources of well-being. Id.
at 609–12.
24. WILSON, supra note 8, at 197. See also ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE (rev. ed. 1992).
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optima might be. Social commentators bemoan the present state of
marriage and divorce, but how do we tell whether we have too many
divorces, too few, or just the right number? For the moment, I consider
just the aspect of the question that involves the joint best interests of the
currently married partners contemplating dissolution.
The ideal of romantic love is that a couple should stay intact just so
long as mutual love endures between the romantic partners, so there is
some presumption that if mutual love between husband and wife ceases,
so should the marriage. Even if mutual love endures, its persistence may
not be enough to enable the couple to avoid inflicting unhappiness on
each other that is remediable only by means of separation and divorce.
These obvious considerations evidently do not, by themselves, amount
to a case for easy divorce. Individuals may tend systematically to
underestimate their own vices that might be causing their marriage to be
foundering, and to overstate the likely causal contribution of what they
perceive to be their spouse’s vices toward marital discord. Hence their
belief that divorce will improve the quality of their lives may
systematically tend to be illusory. Making divorce difficult, rather than
easy to obtain, may alter the incentives potentially divorcing people face
in a way that encourages them to expend more energy on fixing their
broken marriage instead of abandoning it, to their mutual benefit.
At the level of abstract speculation, one might just as well surmise that
people will systematically tend to stick with the devil they know, the
unhappy marriage they are presently enduring, rather than risk the devil
they don’t know, the uncertainties of life after divorce. Or people may
adhere too strenuously to misguided ideals of unconditional love and
commitment—stand by your man, no matter what sort of undesirable
he turns out to be. The more prevalent these scenarios are, the more
counterproductive it would be to erect new hurdles to divorce with an
eye to discouraging people from taking this course.
In other words, the prioritarian willingness in principle to endorse
paternalistic restriction of marriage relationships for the good of the adult
marital partners does not carry any direct implications for policy. People
can be foolish and imprudent, both by exiting too quickly from marriages
that should endure, and from failing to exit quickly enough from
marriages that should be terminated. Simply providing multiple options
of less restrictive and more restrictive forms of marriage—from marriage
lite to nondissolvable union—is not a solution, because people may choose
the wrong form that does not suit their particular propensities and traits.
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There is also the possibility that prudent marital partners will find
themselves with opposed interests concerning whether or not their
marriage should end. One partner may be better off if the marriage ends,
the other partner worse off. Making divorce difficult and costly favors
those whose interests are aligned with the survival of their marriage;
making divorce easy and cheap favors those whose interests are aligned
with its termination.
Here the issue of no-fault versus fault-based divorce and divorce
settlement arises. If one marriage partner is better off if the marriage
continues and the other is better off if the marriage is dissolved, how one
balances the interests of the opposed parties surely varies depending on
whether or not one thinks one of the parties has been abusive or in other
ways vicious in behavior toward the spouse. Though even if one favors
fault-based divorce settlements in principle, in practice one might
suppose fault finding efforts by courts will not be sufficiently reliable
and sensitive to sustain the integrity of the procedures. However, even if
it is assumed that fault-finding procedures will work badly, one might
still favor them, on the ground that they might help foster a cultural shift
toward greater social disapproval of those who fail to sustain marriage
until death do us part. But would such increased public censoriousness
be a good thing or a bad thing on balance?
VIII. DISCOURAGING AND ENCOURAGING CHILDBIRTH
A crucial factor in determining appropriate state policy toward family
life is normative population policy. Should we seek population increase
or decrease? At what rate? Since potential parents in given circumstances
are variously capable of raising children effectively, society will seek
not simply population increase, decrease, or steady state, but will
differentially favor reproduction by the more able or alternatively work
to change the circumstances of those less able to boost their parenting
prospects. At some lower level of parenting ability, society actively
should discourage individuals whose childrearing capacities are at that
level or below from giving birth and raising their own children.25 If
25. This issue must be joined in state policy toward the disabled, especially the
cognitively disabled. See MARTHA A. FIELD AND VALERIE A. SANCHEZ, EQUAL TREATMENT
FOR PEOPLE WITH MENTAL RETARDATION: HAVING & RAISING CHILDREN (1999). In the
U.S. in the late twentieth century, the issue of parental incompetence lurks in policy
discussions concerning single-parent families. Here the unit of assessment is not each
adult parent or guardian figure taken separately, but the fusion of adult caregivers in a
single household. See FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW F. CHERLIN, DIVIDED
FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART (1991); KRISTIN LUKER,
DUBIOUS CONCEPTIONS: THE POLITICS OF TEENAGE PREGNANCY (1996); SUSAN E.
MAYER, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: FAMILY INCOME AND CHILDREN’S LIFE CHANCES
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there is no morally acceptable way to discourage childbirth, society
needs mechanisms of separating incompetent parents from their children,
either by encouraging adoption, or by installing children in orphanages
or, less drastically, by channeling resources to children in ways that
neither depend on the intelligent cooperation, nor reinforce the authority,
of the incompetent parents. These draconian-sounding types of policies
are double-edged swords, which can harm more than they help, if poorly
designed and operated. However, a state that has administrative competence
at its disposal has the responsibility to be a nanny state, and in some
respects an aggressive nanny state.26
IX. DIFFERENCES
Any regulatory regime for marriage faces the daunting task of balancing
many sets of potentially conflicting interests—between children seeking
nurturance and adults seeking adult fulfillment, between individuals with
different romantic propensities who would benefit differentially under
different types of regulatory regime, and between men and women. How it
is reasonable to cope with the last-mentioned conflict depends crucially
on the extent to which men and women are different in traits and needs
in ways that either cannot be eliminated, or should not be eliminated.
(1997); SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT:
WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994); Andrew J. Cherlin et al., Effects of Parental Divorce
on Mental Health Throughout the Life Course, 63 AM. SOC. REV. 239 (1998); William A.
Galston, Causes of Declining Well-Being Among U.S. Children, in SEX, PREFERENCE,
AND FAMILY, supra note 5, at 290.
26. Prioritarianism as I understand it supposes that the choices we make do not
affect the number of people who shall ever live. Relaxing that simplifying assumption,
we would need to determine the moral value of adding a child to the world, given a
stipulation of the lifetime well-being that the child who might be added would attain.
Prioritarianism by itself leaves this further evaluative issue wide open. We might
combine prioritarianism with a critical level doctrine, which asserts that the moral value
of adding a child to the world is negative unless the expected lifetime well-being of the
child exceeds a critical level that is somewhat above the level at which the child herself
would reasonably regard her life as a matter of indifference to her, neither beneficial nor
burdensome. In this exercise one is assuming that the child does not affect the well-being
of any other person. When that assumption is relaxed, we need simultaneously to assess
the moral value of adding a child of given lifetime expected well-being, taking into
account the well-being gains and losses that accrue to other persons due to the existence
of this child. Only with these evaluations in hand is the prioritarian ready to tackle
population policy issues. On critical level doctrines, see Charles Blackorby et al.,
Intertemporal Population Ethics: Critical-Level Utilitarian Principles, 63 ECONOMETRICA
1303 (1995). See also Charles Blackorby et al., Birth-Date Dependent Population Ethics:
Critical-Level Principles, 77 J. ECON. THEORY 260 (1997).
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Many years ago the economist Victor Fuchs commented that “many
different kinds of evidence suggest that on average women feel a
stronger desire for children than men do and a greater concern for their
welfare after they are born.”27 The evidence to which Fuchs alludes might
be misleading or not; suppose it is not. The differences between men
and women that Fuchs cites might be for all practical purposes fixed or
alterable; suppose they are fixed.28 There might be other significant
differences as well—for example, a different propensity to violence.
What then?
If we seek equality of life prospects between men and women, in a
world of difference, the task for social policy would be to arrange
institutions and practices so that the differences between men and
women do not work to the disadvantage of either group. The aim would
not be equal treatment of men and women but treatment that so far as is
feasible given other moral goals, leads to equal life prospects on the
average between men and women.
Notice that the prioritarian’s commitment to such equality is shallow.
Equality of any sort is desirable, for the prioritarian, only in so far as
equality in the circumstances serves the goal of maximizing weighted
well-being. The prioritarian is a calculating feminist, not a committed
feminist.
X. A TIME OF TRANSITION?
In broad terms, one might regard contemporary advanced industrial
democracies including Europe and the U.S. as undergoing a long
transformation toward societies in which men and women participate
equally, and on equal terms, in the labor market and in market
entrepreneurial activity. This transformation puts pressure on many
institutions, notably, the family. It is simply not yet clear what forms of
romantic and marital practices will best suit such sexually egalitarian
societies. The marriage forms we have inherited limp along, and the
ailments we now bemoan may prove temporary or may ultimately
require prosthetic or more radical therapy. Should traditional marriage
give way to a regime of Lockean contract? Should fluid cohabitation
arrangements replace the traditional family arrangement, or should we

27. VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 4 (1988).
28. Fixed, that is, up to the discovery of a practical technology of genetic
manipulation that allows for choice of traits; at that point, all bets are off.
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engineer a new puritanism, if we can? Since we don’t yet have good
answers to these and related questions, perhaps we should regulate with
a light hand, letting a hundred flowers, and doubtless thousands of
weeds, bloom—experiments in living that might provide bright ideas for
future improvement.

29. Posner favors the former, Wilson the latter. Note the prediction of Friedrich
Engels, Karl Marx’s collaborator. Engels surmised that as economic inequality between
men and women diminishes and thus ceases to influence terms of romantic and marital
arrangement, women will be more able to get what they want in the implicit and explicit
bargaining that sets these terms, and will tend to insist on monogamy. FRIEDRICH
ENGELS, THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY, PRIVATE PROPERTY, AND THE STATE 63–64 (1884).
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